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As  Elenora  Belfiore  notes  in  her  introduction  essay  to  Humanities  in  the  Twenty-first
Century: Beyond Utility and Markets, discourse on the value of the humanities can in general be
neatly split along two opposing, yet “tightly linked” (35) and causative, discourses: the humanities
are  either  dying  and  fundamentally  “useless”  (cause);  or  they  are  in  need  of  defence  through
ever-more-inflated claims for their social impact and importance (effect). In this volume Belfiore
and Anna Upchurch have amassed a body of (often both) informed and illustrious commentators to
steer the middle course in these waters, intending to “engage with the current debate on the value,
impact,  and  utility  (or  lack  thereof)  of  the  humanities  […]  thus  trying  to  make  a  positive
contribution  to  live  ethical,  practical,  and  scholarly  challenges”  (4).  The  methodology  through
which the editors propose to achieve their bold statement of purpose lies in a framed presentation of
divergent voices, some militant and polemic, others more elegiac, but always with the ultimate aim
of “agenda-setting”, to have a “practical” purpose (5). Such statements underlie the entire rhetoric
of Humanities in the Twenty-first Century and expose, of course, the very core difficulty of writing
about the humanities, markets and non-utilitarian higher education; how to do so today, even in the
descriptivist  mode  to  which  Belfiore  and  Upchurch  aspire,  without  producing  a  work  that  is
functional, political and pragmatic, even as it decries each and every one of those traits in the object
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of its defence?1 This is important for, as David Loosely notes in this volume, with reference to Jan
Parker,  “humanities  methodologies  are  especially  sensitive  to  the  way  that  cultural  and
epistemelogical frames of reference affect the outcome of any investigation” (101).
The book itself is structured fivefold around a discussion of “impact” (across both historical
and particularly UK-based policy contexts); a meditation on the ideologies of “utility” as opposed to
“value”;  a  section  on  interdisciplinarity;  a  penultimate  debate  on  the  humanities  and  market
economics; and a final strand on the impact of digital forms upon our disciplines. This structure
proves remarkably effective, most admirably so for its self-awareness. More so than, say, Stefan
Collini's  nonetheless  excellent  What  are Universities  For?,  Belfiore  and  Upchurch's  collection
explicitly  situates  itself  within  cyclical  historical  discourses  of  crisis  and  methodological
frameworks of humanities practice, citing discourse analysis and archival research as the foremost
examples (7).2
That said, as Belfiore and Upchurch's book is comprised of cross-cutting arguments and
multiple voices, the way in which they have chosen to structure this  work often neglects other
groupings and narratives that might have been profitably explored. Indeed, although they posit five
topic areas, it seems to this reader that the work can also be fruitfully considered through a more
economical  three:  1.)  academic  laïcité:  an  exploration  of  recent  attempts  to  decouple  liberal
humanism's  supposed  political  functions  of  higher  education  (the  production  of  autonomous,
critically  informed  democratic  citizens)  from  its  didactic  role;  2.)  technological
fetishism/utopianism: asking whether digital methods and dissemination can save the humanities (if
they need saving); 3.) value: the systems and domains of appraisal for scholarship and teaching in
the humanities.
The first of my redefined axes for traversing this work, academic laïcité, is perhaps the most
1 Without wishing to overly fall here into the trap of construing Belfiore and Upchurch's own descriptivist 
characterization of the humanities as a defence, as is so often the case. See Stefan Collini, p. 61.
2 Although, in some ways Belfiore's opening essay is an expansion of a discourse analysis that Collini himself 
undertakes briefly. See Collini, p. 39.
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important, even though smaller and in reality only a subset of the third. It asks: how is the liberal
humanist political role of the humanities being transformed into mere “knowledge transfer”? Jim
McGuigan passionately argues here that this depoliticization of academia is being achieved through
top-down politics, the transformation of the soul that Margaret Thatcher claimed was the object of
political economics (84). Focusing on the forced mutation of higher education from a public good to
a private benefit, McGuigan's piece is among the most explicitly political in this volume. Of interest
also in this sphere, though, is Mark O'Neill's revelation of museums as ideological forces to shape
the future and mourn the past, as institutions that cannot be severed from the political contexts that
surround them, but not by necessity put to benevolent use. In truth, it is among the proliferation of
studies of the museum that this volume perhaps most clearly shows its power-knowledge hand: all
showcases  or  acts  of  curation  –  including  the  specifically  subjectively-shaped  outputs  of  the
humanities – are, by their nature, ideological (158). Our ethical qualms must be with the uses to
which  they  are  put,  not  their  a  priori entanglement  with  use.  As  O'Neill  puts  it:  “both  the
employment  and authority  of  experts  in  a  democracy are  contingent  upon their  supporting  the
legitimate aims of that democracy” (159).
Moving to the second axis – technological fetishism/utopianism – and it is clear, however,
that  this  conclusion  of  an  inherent  political  use  remains  debatable.  Although  multifaceted,  the
arguments that fall under this heading seem broadly to concern a resistance to instrumental reason,
best embodied in Jan Parker's piece.3 Although repetitiously over-populated with the phrase “our
hermeneutic is” (51, 56, 60), Parker sets out a clear manifesto for the rejection of a totally digitized
humanities (or at least the strands of toolset development/use and disciplinary reconfigurations (50)
that here metonymically stand for the broad catch-all term, “digital humanities”). In Parker's eyes, it
is the derivation of “plural, avowedly partial” interpretations “from a single, particular event” (56)
that  encompasses  the  core  of  humanities  practice  and  that  stands  threatened  by
“inductive-deductive” (60) modes that are inherent to data-driven digital methods. This strand of
3 This is also the explicit definition that Connie Johnston uses in her transdisciplinary study of geography (138).
4/6
pluralisation is continued in Howard I. Kushner and Leslie S. Leighton's contribution examining
medical history.4 In fact, they note that their field of study often sits in problematic contrast to the
fetishised τέχνη of clinical historians: “If clinical historians are […] in search of  the history of
medicine,  academic  historians  are  committed  to  laying  out  the  histories  of  medicine”  (113).
Interestingly, however, it seems that tolerance for plurality still comes ensconced within a ruthless
dialectic of argumentation whose eventual aim is synthetic, particularly when it applies to our own
disciplines. As Belfiore notes in her piece on open access, despite it being “impossible to find fault
with the sentiment and possibilities” outlined by proponents of OA, the implementation remains
“problematic”, despite the presence of “considerable corporate resistance” and “remarkable profit
margin” (203-4), aspects that one would imagine Parker's envisaged academic community to be
definitely aligned against.
Bearing the great nuance of the volume in mind, there are nonetheless some problematic
aspects of technological enthusiasm exhibited at points in this book. Consider, for instance, Rick
McGeer's suggestion that, in the digital landscape, “any person's voice can be heard” (217). This
must come as news to women who face online misogyny, people of colour subjected to overtly
racist  silencing  on  social  media,  members  of  LGBT communities  who  continue  to  experience
marginalisation, those disabled through lack of accessibility, prisoners without internet access and
those without the infrastructure or personal means to get online; the list continues.5 That said, the
chapter  by  Olson  that  closes  this  volume,  in  which  he  calls  (contra  Stanley  Fish)  for  a
practice-based,  embodied,  hacker  ethos  for  the  humanities  offers  a  way  out  of  false  technical
utopianism while also highlighting, through a well known dictum, that the point could well be to
change the world, not merely to interpret it.
4 It is notable that, in the original structure, this chapter does feel somewhat isolated/dis-integrated despite its 
fascinating and truly important subject matter.
5 In fact, I had some other problems with McGeer's essay (although greatly enjoyed his excellent scathing 
commentary on Mark Helprin) but will not list them all. For instance, however: “copyright […] has no stated public
benefit other than the enrichment of the producer. […] The fundamental justification for copyright is the enrichment
of the copyright holder, on the theory that rewarding content producers will lead to more content” (218). The 
second clause of this second sentence is the public benefit theorised in copyright, along with the eventual (even if, 
as McGeer rightly notes, unjustly deferred) release to the public domain.
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On the final axis of the book, in my remapping, we come to “value”, the clearest trouble
spot for humanities discourse. In this grouping it is Michael Bérubé who leads the pack with his
reproduced  Qui Parle  piece on “The Futility of the Humanities”. Assessing here the humanities'
contribution to real-lived experience of, for example, disability (73), Bérubé also persuasively, if
contentiously. argues that the comparable increases in Collegiate Learning Assessment test scores of
humanities students to their scientific peers demonstrates clear usefulness, with a 69 point lead over
those  studying  business  management.  Interestingly,  from  the  other  side  of  this  debate,  David
Loosely points out that he and other linguists have always had such a functionalist argument readily
available,  but  worry  that  such  logic  may  end  in  reduced  disciplinary  variance.  Meanwhile,
Upchurch and Jean McLaughlin take a novel premise for their discussion of value: the purported
need by a consortium of environmental activists to move beyond the “facts and evidence” on an
issue  and,  instead,  to  appeal  to  “emotions  and  personal  values  [beliefs  tied  to  emotions]  of
individuals” (174). While I was less clear about the intervention signalled by this piece – is this just
a matter of communicating a “mission statement” of “core values”? – I was still enthused by their
suggestion that Penland School yields a model for education that could reclaim a true utopian field:
as shelter from the “competitive experience of the market economy” (190).
Overall, despite my minor criticisms, this is a superb work that forms a solid starting point
for thinking about the future of the humanities in the twenty-first century. I was left wondering,
though,  whether  the  editors'  opening  claim –  that  this  book is  not  militant  –  was  not  slightly
disingenuous.  Beyond their  note  that  most  of  the  authors  proceed  from a  shared  suspicion  of
neoliberal messianism of the market, in the reconfigured mapping that I've set out above, which is
one  that  I  hope  demonstrates  the  plurality  of  overlaps  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  material
singularity of this work, there emerged in my mind a core shared desire to see the work of these
disciplines continue, regardless of whether this was achieved through, or in the name of, politics,
technology or use/value. And I felt that the contributors, and probably the editors too, were ready to
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fight for that.
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